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Abstract
After strong currency crisis, in January 1999, Brazil implemented
flexible exchange rate regime combined with inflation targeting.
Some economists believe that emerging markets do not allow the
exchange rate to float as much they had announced and therefore
they suffer from the fear of floating. However, in this article there is
evidence to believe that central banks in the emerging markets care
about inflation ratter than exchange rate. The remarkable result found
in this article is that the aggressiveness of the interest rate reaction to
inflation explains far more the current monetary and exchange rate
policy in Brazil than the idea of the fear of floating.
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1. Introduction
Six years after the Central Bank of Brazil has
implemented the inflation targeting regime quite a lot has been
discussed about its attractiveness. Many emerging markets have
experienced floating regime combined with inflation target, but
even announcing an independently floating exchange rate
regime
1, their currencies have not been allowed to float so
much. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that these countries
suffer from the “fear of floating” and they make intensive use
of interest rate and foreign reserves interventions in order to
limit their exchange rate volatility.
Eichengreen (2002) suggests that the central bank, even
having concerns about the exchange rate variability, does not
care about exchange rate in the same way it does with inflation.
Moreover, while a central bank raises interest rates in order to
smooth the depreciation of the domestic currency, mainly
during “Calvo shock” (a sudden stop in the capital inflows), “it
will not prevent the exchange rate from moving, as the strong
‘fear of floating’ view would suggest. (…) Thus, while the
degree of exchange rate flexibility will be limited by central
bank policy, such flexibility will not be entirely eliminated. The
currency will still exhibit great flexibility than when it is
pegged” (Eichengreen, 2002:15). The consequence of this
argument is that the more temporary the Calvo shock the less
the fear of floating.
Again, the central bank can not display the fear of
floating when it has no instruments to prevent the exchange rate
from adjusting to a new long run equilibrium. Certainly, it can
raise the interest rate if the exchange rate depreciates, even
though there is no real reason to believe that it will reduce the
interest rate when the exchange rate appreciates. Then, the fear
of floating approach would be unsuccessful.
One direct way to assess whether a central bank has
suffered from fear of floating is by estimating the reaction
                                                
1 Brazil has experienced an independently floating exchange rate regime
according to IMF’s  De Jure classification (2004), and even in terms of
Bubula and Ökter-Robe (2002)’s  De Facto classification.3
functions of the Central Bank on inflation pressure
2. In this
case, a central bank cares far more about inflation rather than it
cares about exchange rate volatility. Then, this article presents
some empirical evidences that support the idea that the Central
Bank of Brazil has quite a lot concerns about inflation rate and
inflation is definitely the focus that policymakers have.
Estimates of the IS and Phillips Curves are presented followed
by estimates of the reaction functions according to Clarida, Gali
and Gertle (1997) after adjusting Taylor-type interest rate rule
to take into account a forward-looking version.
Brazil maybe shows some aggravates such as relative
high speed of pass through, the difficulty of forecasting
inflation, liability dollarization and credibility issues, as
highlighted by Eichengreen (2002) as elements that distinguish
emerging markets from developed economies. The reader will
find some considerations about credibility issues. In the
Brazilian case the credibility building process in the monetary
policy associated with the inflation forecast remains a big
difficulty.
2. The Brazilian Experience
In January 1999, after a strong currency crisis, Brazil
implemented the flexible exchange rate regime. More than six
years late, has Brazilian currency floated less than predictable
by its classification and exhibited the fear of floating? In other
words, has the Central Bank of Brazil used foreign reserves and
interest rate to limit exchange rate volatility? Even if Brazil has
pursued this policy is it the fear of floating or a symptom of the
inability of fixing
3? Does a Central Bank in an emerging market
really have the ability to prevent high exchange rate flexibility?
                                                
2 However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) proposed to build an Exchange Rate
Flexibility Index based on ratio between the exchange rate variance and the
sum of the variances of the interest rate and the foreign reserves. See
Holland (2005) for an assessment about this topic in Brazil.
3 Herein inability of fixing does not mean that the central bank has tried to
manage the exchange rate in the way it did during the pegged regime (1994-
1998) and cannot anymore. It means that exchange rate stability can be a
resting place in a country that shows high “domestic original sin” and trade
imbalance.4
Controlling inflation rate at a low level can be
dynamically inconsistent and Brazil might be one remarkable
example. How can credibility problem in an emerging market
like Brazil be considered? According to figure 1, the inflation
rates variances are extraordinarily high even in this sample
(1995-2005) of the recent history of price stabilization. During
this period of time, the annual inflation rates averaged between
8.01 and 13.9 per cent and their variances measured by
standard deviation varied from 5.3 to 10.2 per cent, in IPCA
(Broad Consumer Price Index) and IPA (Wholesale Price
Index), respectively.
Quite a lot has been debated in Brazil about the
effectiveness of the inflation targeting regime. As one can see
in the figure 2 the Central Bank of Brazil has had difficulties to
manage the inflation rate index (IPCA) used to reach the center
of the announced inflation band. The target could barely be
reached only in 2003 and 2004 because central bank announced
changes in the targets motivated by presidential election shock
in 2002. In two consecutives years, 2001 and 2002, the
inflation rate surpassed the target, igniting the debate about the
attractiveness of the inflation targeting regimes in emerging
markets like Brazil. According to Eichengreen (2002:37),
“Credibility problems make inflation targeting less attractive.
They imply more volatility and less flexible policy
implementation. The question is then how quickly credibility
can be gained and whether or not inflation targeting can be part
of that process”. That is definitely a remarkable issue nowadays
in Brazil when after six years adopting inflation target remains
the question whether or not it is time to be considered credible
the central bank’s commitment with low inflation.
Then, not only inflation rates have been pretty volatile,
but also the announced targets to inflation have not been
properly reached. Both these facts may be affecting the
credibility building process in the monetary policy, even under
tremendous effort of the central bank in demonstrating its
commitment with the low inflation and fiscal balance
4.
                                                
4 Minella et all (2003) show a comprehensive analysis about the way
Brazilian Central Bank has tried to build credibility under high exchange
rate volatility.5
















Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Notes: IPA-DI (Wholesale Price Index); IGP-M (General Price Index); IPC (Consumer Price
Index) and IPCA (Broad Consumer Price Index).
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It turns out that the policy issues somehow have to deal
with a problem of causality and ambiguousness. Can inflation
targeting regimes help emerging markets to build credibility?
5
                                                
5 Ball and Sheridan (2003) ask whether inflation targeting improves
economic performance, as measured by the behavior of inflation, output,6
The question could be established in different perspective. Is it
possible Central Banks with low credibility (history of
inflation) implement successfully inflation targeting regime?
6
On one hand, this monetary policy strategy rescue the
important role played by central bank as the coordinator of the
monetary policy. However, on the other hand, if the Central
Bank suffers from the fear of floating, inflation targeting and
hard peg are basically indistinguishable. Again, Brazil can be
an emblematic country-case that experienced pegged exchange
rate followed by inflation target and therefore one can clearly
evaluate how the fear of floating looks like.
Once more Eichengreen (2002:39) sums up in
appropriate words this phenomenon in emerging markets: “The
greater exchange rate flexibility promised by inflation targeting
will be possible, although the central bank’s appetite for
indulging in it will have limits”. Then, there are sharp
constraints upon to Central Banks’ willingness and they have
no ability to achieve by themselves exchange rate stability.
What is behind the exchange rate volatility is neither
necessarily the fear of floating nor inflation targeting per se. In
addition, Brazil has the problem of the composition and level of
government debt to be considered.
3. Monetary Policy in Practice in Brazil since 1999
No long Brazil has put in place an inflation targeting
strategy in mid-1999 the Brazilian Central Bank’ staff
presented a basic framework according to a small-scale
macroeconomic models used for disciplining discussions about
monetary policy within the Central Bank (Bogdanski, Tombini
and Werlang, 2001). Even in that time it was recognized that
what the new monetary strategy did was inflation forecast ratter
than reacting to present facts Brazilian policymakers should
                                                                                                       
and interest rates and the author did not find significant difference between
targeters and non-targeter.
6 Bogdanski, Tombini and Werlang (2001) provide a fairly analytical
background about the process of implementing inflation targeting in Brazil
and in several parts of that article one can easily see the difficulties in that
process, from the learning about the new monetary strategy to be adopted to
the choice of the price index to be reference for the target.7
follow a simple structural model combining an IS curve, a
Phillips Curve, an UIP condition and a Taylor-type  interest
rate rule. Six years late this simple model is reviewed and
estimates of these standard specifications can be found in order
to start up the evaluation about the monetary policy in practice
in Brazil. In other words, this section assesses the reaction
functions the central bank has been really adopting. Regarding
this problem can be a direct way to analysis if Brazil suffers
from the fear of floating ratter than it cares about inflation.
Therefore, if the reaction functions of the Brazilian Central
Bank to inflation shocks are not higher enough in context of the
low exchange rate volatility one can assume that this economy
can not float as truly independently floating economies float.
Data set
It was used monthly data from July 1999 (when Brazil
implemented the inflation targeting regime) to January 2005.
Consumer price index was used to measure actual inflation and
industrial production index (seasonally adjusted) to measure
output and afterward smoothing the log of industrial production
using linear trend and Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain output
gap. The interest rate is the Over-Selic. Exchange rate R$/US$
was deflated by consumer price index (Brazil) and wholesale
price index (U.S.) to obtain real exchange rate. Finally, US
Federal Funds Rate measures the international monetary policy
that can be affecting Brazilian monetary policy.
The Practice
First of all, the IS Curve is estimated as the following
general expression:
h
t T t t t t t DU Fiscal r h h h ε β β β β β + + + + + + = − − − − 1 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 0
where:  t h is the log of the output gap obtained by the difference
between actual and potential GDP smoothing out the GDP
series through both Hodrick-Prescott filter and linear trend;  t r is
the log of the real interest rate [log(1+R)] estimated from Over-
Selic;  Fiscal is the Federal Domestic Debt as a percentage of8





Table 1 shows three difference specifications of the IS
Curve using HP filter and others three using linear trend in
order to measure output gap. Estimations with HP filter were
found far better than those with linear trend. In all of them
estimated with HP filter the sign of the interest rate is negative
and statistically significant. This apparently wrong sign has one
possible explanation “that part of the supply shocks that hit the
economy led to an increase in inflation and simultaneously to a
reduction in output” (Minella et all, 2003:14). As the dummy
variable for energy crisis was found significant and its
introduction in the IS equation led to the reduction in the
estimated parameter  3 β , that is most likely the case of rationing
in electricity that changed a lot the firms and households’
behaviors for more than the official period of rationing. Our
fiscal variable was not found statistically significant and can be
easily explained for the fact that the domestic debt has
dynamics predominantly finance in close association with
country risk.
Next step is towards estimating the backward-looking
Phillip Curve that can be expressed as the following:
t t
F
t t t t t e p h ε α α α π α π α π + + ∆ + + + = − − − 5 4 1 3 2 2 1 1
where:  t π is the log of price inflation measured by Consumer
Price Index; 
F
t p is the log of foreign producer price index
measured by Wholesale Price Index in the U.S.A.;  t e is the log
of exchange rate variation
8; and  t ε is supply shock. Table 2
shows easily that the backward-looking specification for
Phillips curve outcomes definitely weak estimations.
                                                
7 The official period of rationing was May 2001-Feb 2002, but its effect
perhaps had been extended more over time because the changes in behavior
of the firms and households.
8 Real depreciation was tested instead of nominal depreciation but it was
found no significant.9






































































































Notes: P-values in parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. It was implemented dummy variables for Presidential Election (2002) and all were also
significant at 5%.




































































39% 2.07 1.54 61
Notes: P-value in parentheses. ** significant at 5%. It was also implemented dummy variables
for Presidential Election (2002) and all were also significant at 5%. SC stands for Schwarz
Criterion.
Though the Brazilian Central Bank has no the same
degree of autonomy over its monetary policy that the G3’s
central banks have, it is fair to say that the main operating
instrument of monetary policy is a short term interest rate.
According to Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997)’s seminal article,
the central bank has a target for nominal short term interest
rate, 
*
t r , that is based on the state of economy, and depends on
both expected inflation and output:
) ] | [ ( ) ] | [ (
* * *
t t t t n t t y y E E r r − Ω + − Ω + = + γ π π β (1)10
where  r  is the long run equilibrium nominal rate,  n t+ π is the
rate of inflation between periods t and  n t + ,  t y  is real output,
and 
* π  and 
*
t y  are bliss point of inflation and output (potential
output), respectively. As the real rate can be expressed by
] | [ t n t t t E r rr Ω − ≡ + π , (1) yield:
) ] | [ ( ] | [ )( 1 (
* *
t t t t n t t y y E E r r rr − Ω + Ω − + = + γ π β (2)
where  r r  is the long run equilibrium real interest rate.
According to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997:5), “A
straightforward but critical point is that the magnitude of the
parameter  β  is key. If  1 > β  the target real rate adjusts to
stabilize changes in inflation (…) With 1 < β , it instead moves
to accommodate expected rise in inflation”. Next to proceed to
empirical specifications the authors assume that the actual rate
partially adjust to the target:
t t t v r r r t + + − = −1
* ) 1 ( ρ ρ (3)
where the parameter  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ ρ  captures the degree of interest
rate smoothing
9, and  t v  is an exogenous random shock i.i.d.
Defining 
* βπ α − ≡ r  and 
*
t t t y y x − ≡  and then
rewriting (1):
] | [ ] | [
*
t t t n t t x E E r Ω + Ω + = + γ π β α (4)
Combining (4) and (3):
t t t t t n t t v r x E E r + + Ω + Ω + − = − + 1 ]} | [ ] | [ ){ 1 ( ρ γ π β α ρ (5)
Finally, eliminating the unobserved forecast variables
from the expression by rewriting the policy rule in terms of
realized variables as the follows:
t t t n t t r x r ε ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ + + − + − + − = − + 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (( 6 )
where the error term
t t t t t n t n t t v x E x E + Ω − + Ω − − − ≡ + + ])} | [ ( ]) | [ ( ){ 1 ( γ π π β ρ ε  is
a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation and
output and the exogenous disturbance  t v . Let  t u  be a vector of
variables within the central bank’s information set at the time it
                                                
9 In an estimation by OLS using Over-Selic and Selic Target, for the sample
1999:08-2005:03, Brazil shows  035 . 0 = ρ  and therefore  ρ − 1  = 0.96. All
coefficients were found statistically significant at 5%.11
chooses the interest rate (i.e.  t t u Ω ∈ ) and  0 ] | [ = t t u E ε .
Then: | ˆ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1 − + − − − − − − − t t n t t r y r E ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ ut] = 0.
To estimate the parameter vector ] , , , [ α ρ γ β , the authors use
GMM (generalized method of moments), and the instrument set
ut includes lagged values of output, inflation, interest rate and
commodity prices. “Under our assumption, that implies the
existence of value for  ] , , , [ α ρ γ β  such that the implied residual
t ε is orthogonal to the variables in the information set  t Ω .
Under the alternative, however, the central bank adjusts the
interest rate in response to change in some current and/or
lagged variables, but not necessarily in connection with the
information that those changes contain about future inflation
and output.” (Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1997:9-10).
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997) also use the parameter
estimates β  and α  to recover an estimate of the central bank’s
target inflation rate, 
* π . Given 
* βπ α − ≡ r  and
* π + = r r r ,
* ) 1 ( π β α − + ≡ r r , which implies:  ) 1 ( ) (
* − − = β α π r r . An
extended model takes into account alternatives variables such
as real exchange rate, foreign interest rate and money supply.
Assessing six years of free floating in Korea,
Eichengreen (2004) followed the approach of Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1997) in order to answer how important inflation, the
real economy and the exchange rate have been in the policy
decision of the Bank of Korea. Eichengreen (2004) as well as
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997) estimated forward-looking
reaction functions employing Generalized Methods of
Moments (GMM). In this case, the reaction function is
basically a forward-looking version of a backward-looking
reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993). The instrument
set includes 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the output gap,
inflation, log difference of the exchange rate. It is important to
highlight that the ending point is twelve months prior to the
latest available data in possession and this research did this
following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997) and Eichengreen
(2004) “because the year-ahead ex post inflation rate is one of
our right hand side variables” (Clarida, Galí and Gertler,
1997:13).12
This work follows them in the estimates of the reaction
function of the Brazilian Central Bank and the results of the
baseline model are showed in the tables 3 and the table 4 shows
variants of this model. In our baseline model the instrument set
includes lagged values of the industrial production index,
inflation rate measured by CPI, real exchange rate
depreciation
10 and interest rate Over-Selic. One can interpret
the results as the following: “under the null, the central bank
adjusts the interest rate each period so that (5) holds, with the
expectations on the right hand side based on all the relevant
information available to policymakers at that time” (Clarida,
Galí and Gertler, 1997:9).


































































Notes: P-values in parentheses. *** and ** significant at 10% and 5%, respectively. It was
also implemented dummy variables for Presidential Election (2002) and all were also
significant at 5%. The rate of real exchange rate depreciation is lagged one month. The
instruments are a constant and lags 1-6, 9 and 12 of the overnight interest rate (Over-Selic),
industrial production index, real exchange rate depreciation and inflation CPI. The sample was
adjusted in 12-month less than the ending point of the available data set. Estimates are
obtained by GMM with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation. Optimal weighing matrix










r r for specifications (1) and (3):  36 . 7 ) 1 (
* = π and 75 . 2 ) 3 (
* = π ,
respectively. These estimates assume that long run equilibrium real interest rate is equal to
sample average (1999-2005) of rr = 9.52%. As the long term equilibrium inflation rate can
vary a lot the average between than is 5.05. By using the sample average real interest rate to
proxy r r , our estimate of 
* π cannot differ from the sample average of π (=7.4) only when
use HP filter.
Controlling inflation became a major focus of monetary
policy even in countries where central banks have some
                                                
10 Both level and first difference of the nominal and real exchange rate were
tested as explanatory variables and as instruments (see table 4).13
reasonable degree of autonomy over their domestic monetary
policy. Brazil does not represent an exception. Moreover, the
estimate of the long term equilibrium inflation rate (7.36%) can
show how big inflation in Brazil is in comparison with other
countries.
The key result is the estimate of the coefficient on the
inflation,  β , and the result depends on quite a lot the way
output gap was calculated (either Hodrick-Prescott filter or
Linear Trend). By computing output gap using linear trend the
coefficients are greater than the ones estimated using HP
filter
11. At first sight, there is no reasonable explanation about
this difference. Taking the second specification, when
33 . 2 = β , a rise in expected annual inflation of the one percent
induces the Brazilian Central Bank to raise interest rates by 133
basis points. Because β is much greater than one, the
prediction than the Central Bank of Brazil raises the interest
rates in response to inflationary pressures is statistically
significant. Once more the estimate of the coefficient on the
output gap is negative and no statistically significant at 5 per
cent and again the energy crisis can be the explanation for the
apparently wrong sign. During the rationing of electricity the
annual interest rate moved from about 14 to 22 per cent (see
figure 3). Then, during recessive period, and meanwhile the
inflation rate raised under supply shock condition, the interest
rate showed upwards movements. Finally, the estimates of the
coefficient on real exchange rate depreciation were found no
statistically significant. It was also allowed consider
alternatives to the baseline specification including foreign
interest rate (US federal fund rates) and foreign inflation rates
(US inflation measured from wholesale price index) in order to
assess whether the Brazilian Central Bank takes US monetary
policy as external constraint. However, they are not statistically
significant.
The table 4 presents different empirical findings. It was
run specifications with interest rate in both level and first
difference for two reasons: first, the unit root tests were not
                                                
11 Some difference can be found in the Korean case (Eichengreem, 2004).14
robust enough to irrefutably accept the null hypothesis
12; and,
second, the central bank might be focused on the level of the
interest rate ratter than on its variation. Figure 3 illustrates that
the level of the interest rate can be mean reversible and then
specifications in first difference would be inappropriate.  Next
one can see nominal depreciation instead of real depreciation.
According to the table 4 that shows alternative way of
calculating output gap and currency depreciation the coefficient
β averages 3.93, what is definitely high when compared with
other international experiences.
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil
However, differently from the baseline specification in
the table 3, now the fluctuations in the exchange rate matter
when policymakers are operationalzing monetary policy.
Nominal depreciation matters for expected inflation because
nominal exchange rate was included in the information set and
then Brazilian Central Bank does not disregard nominal
variations, only when country risk is included in the
information set, although it might be disregarding real
variations. Specifications without including country risk in the
information set accepted nominal depreciation as statistically
                                                
12 All variables were tested for unit roots using ADF and Phillips-Perron
tests.15
significant only when HP filter was used to estimate output
gap. Real exchange rate depreciation was not found significant
whether or not country risk was treated as instrument. It can be
explained by the intensive changes in the commodities prices
and also by balance of payments adjustment issues. Likely
during this time the Central Bank has shortsightedness in its
insights about the changes in the purchase power parity. The
estimated variants produce positive coefficient on the excess of
actual output over capacity output only when linear trend was
used to calculate the output gap. Again, the coefficients of the
inflation are greater when output gap is computed by linear
trend than those obtained when the gap is computed by HP
filter.
Differently the results Eichengreen (2004) found for the
Korean case, and because the first lag of the real currency
appreciation is also included in the information set used to
forecast inflation, the interpretation of this coefficient is that the
Central Bank of the Brazil does not care about the movement of
the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate does not matter
for the conduct of monetary policy in Brazil when both
inflation and monetary policy credibility remains a big
problem.
Therefore, the conclusion that one can draw is that the
nominal exchange rate matters for the conduct of monetary
policy in Brazil, but real depreciations do not, when country
risk is included in the information set and, moreover, when
nominal exchange rate is included it reduces the coefficient of
the inflation slightly.
Summing up, the question is whether or not movements
in the exchange rate are actually important for the objectives of
the Brazilian Central Bank. This article found two different and
important results even apparently contradictory. Real
depreciations are not as important in the reaction functions of
the interest rate as the nominal ones and there are two
important mechanisms that can be the explanation of the
remarkable result.16








































































































































































































Notes: t-values in parentheses. * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and ** significant at 10%. The J-
statistic reported is the minimized value of the objective function. Test of Overidentifying Restriction J=11.25
chi-squared (47) with p-value = 0.96. The J-statistic is used to carry out hypothesis tests from GMM estimation
(see Newey and West, 1987). A simple application of the J-statistic is to test the validity of overidentifying
restrictions when one has more instruments than parameters to estimate. Here we have instrument set to
estimate four parameters and so there are three overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the
overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is
asymptotically x
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.  It was
implemented dummy variables for Presidential Election (2002) and all were also significant at 5%. Both
nominal and real exchange rate depreciation are lagged one month. The instruments are a constant and lags 1-
6, 9 and 12 of the overnight interest rate (Over-Selic), industrial production index, either nominal or real
exchange rate depreciation, country risk (EMBI+) and inflation CPI. The sample was adjusted in 12-month less
than the ending point of the available data set. Estimates are obtained by GMM with correction for MA (12)17
autocorrelation. Optimal weighing matrix obtained from first step 2SLS parameter estimates. Convergence
achieved after 80 weight matrices and, 81 total coefficient iterations.
On one hand, there is a direct channel of transmission
passing by country risk and affecting nominal movements in
the exchange rate and the central bank does not disregard it.
One the other hand, there are direct and indirect effects of the
relative prices such as commodities price shocks and low pass
through (see the relationship between the wholesale price and
consumer price indexes in figure 1) that makes central bank
shortsighted to evaluate the equilibrium real exchange rate.
This last feature is not surprising according to the recent
Brazilian experience. The real exchange rate showed
unequivocal downward movement and the domestic currency
depreciated about 22 per cent since the flexible regime (using
WPI –wholesale price index- as deflator). However, using the
other deflator (CPI – Consumer Price Index), it does not
sustain. Domestic currency would have appreciated about 23
per cent over that period of time (1999-2005). The difference
between those two deflators (wholesale and consumer price
index) can come from another mechanism beyond the exchange
rate dynamics and it might be tightly associated with the
responses of the central bank in the context of “Calvo shock”
by increasing interest rate and, therefore, depressing the
components of aggregate demand, such as investment and
consumption. Then, the lower the aggregate consumption is the
lower the pass through from the wholesale price to the
consumer price
13.  It seems like “Prebisch shock” as labeled by
Eichengreen (2002:18): “Now there are two offsetting effects
on inflation: while higher import prices will be passed through
into inflation, weaker aggregate demand will be deflationary”.
One can now compare the results with other ones found
for other Central Banks around the world. Table 5 provides
estimates of the coefficient on the inflation in different country
and they vary from 0.98 (England) to 2.04 (Japan). Prior
estimates of the Brazilian coefficient vary from 2.09 (using
market’s inflation expectation) to 3.54 (using Central Bank’s
inflation expectations). Differently the Minella et all (2003) this
work followed Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997)’ procedures
                                                
13 We also have the commodities price shock and administrated prices to be
taken into account in other occasion.18
and obtained estimates from 2.33 (using HP filter) to 4.35
(using Linear Trend). Adding the rate of exchange rate
depreciation reduces the magnitude of the other coefficient
slightly.






































































































































Notes: P-value in parentheses. ** and * significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
a/ Using Central Bank’s inflation expectations.
b/ Using Market’s inflation expectations.
c/ GMM Estimates using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
d/ GMM estimates using linear trend.
e/ CGG stands for Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997)
4. Final Remarks
This article presented evidence analyzing the hypothesis
of the fear of floating and one could see that the Brazilian
Central Bank does not suffer from the fear of floating. Lack of
credibility associated with both difficulties in forecasting
inflation and in reaching the target of the inflation can be the
main factor to explain the inability of fixing, that is, the
difficulty of managing the exchange rate. It is remarkable how
the empirical findings are sensitive to alternative ways of
estimating the output gap and also sensitive to addition of some
variables in the information set.19
This article sheds light on the idea that in context of
inflation forecast problem a central bank has shortsightedness
in its insights about long term equilibrium real exchange rate.
On one hand, in a short-term perspective, central bank can be
shortsighted in using its main monetary instrument to control
the real exchange rate volatility. In our empirical results the
reaction functions do not response to rate exchange shocks, but
they do response to nominal depreciations what can be
understood as the fact that the financial instability matters ratter
than the real long term exchange rate misalignments. In other
words, in a long-term perspective, central bank receives
different signs to deal with the equilibrium exchange rate.
Finally, there is fair evidence that the Brazilian Central
Bank reacts more strongly to inflationary pressures than the
other central banks around the world. This could be explained
by credibility issues and in a near future would be highly
advisable to react less radically that it has been done so far. It is
easily understood that a central bank in an emerging market
economy takes long time to build credibility in its commitment
with low inflation and, as the Brazilian inflation targeting can
count a history of success, the credibility would allow changes
in the reaction function. Last words: the reaction function has
been strong enough to improve credibility and the change in the
reaction should be considered in the order to uphold the
accomplishment.
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